In Sakumoto et al. (CRYPTO 2011, LNCS, vol 6841. Springer, Berlin, pp 706-723, 2011, presented a new multivariate identification scheme, whose security is based solely on the MQ-Problem of solving systems of quadratic equations over finite fields. In this paper we extend this scheme to a threshold ring identification and signature scheme. Our scheme is the first multivariate scheme of this type and generally one of the first multivariate signature schemes with special properties. Despite of the fact that we need more rounds to achieve given levels of security, the signatures are at least twice shorter than those obtained by other post-quantum (e.g. code based) constructions. Furthermore, our scheme offers provable security, which is quite a rare fact in multivariate cryptography.
Introduction
Since the introduction of threshold ring signatures in 2002 [7] , a number of schemes in this area were proposed [6, 15] . Most of them are based on number theoretic problems and therefore will be broken when large enough quantum computers are built [2] .
Therefore we need alternatives for these schemes. In the last years much work has been done to develop post-quantum threshold ring signature schemes. These schemes are based on mathematical problems which are not affected by Shor's algorithm [20] and therefore are believed to resist attacks with quantum computers [2] . We want to mention here the code-based construction by Aguilar et al. [1] and the lattice-based scheme of Cayrel et al. [8] .
In this paper we propose a new threshold ring signature scheme based on multivariate polynomial systems. We achieve this by extending the identification scheme of [19] to a threshold ring identification scheme and applying the Fiat-Shamir paradigm [12] to transform it into a signature scheme. Although our scheme requires more rounds than code-and lattice-based schemes to reach the same level of security, it produces signatures which are at least twice shorter than that of code-and lattice-based constructions [1, 8] . In particular, both the signature length and the computational complexity of our scheme are independent of t and linear in N . Our scheme is the first multivariate scheme of this type and generally one of the first multivariate signature schemes with special properties. The security of our scheme is based solely on the MQ-Problem of solving systems of multivariate quadratic equations over finite fields. Therefore our scheme offers provable security, which is quite a rare fact in multivariate cryptography.
The outline of this paper is as follows: In the next section we recall the basic definitions about cryptographic techniques needed for the construction of our scheme. Section 4 introduces the identification scheme of [19] which is the basis of our construction. In Sect. 4 we show how to extend this scheme to a threshold ring identification and signature scheme and describe our scheme in detail, whereas Sect. 5 considers the security of the scheme. In Sect. 6 we give concrete parameters for our scheme and compare it with other existing post-quantum threshold ring signature schemes in terms of key and signature sizes. Finally, Sect. 7 concludes the paper.
Preliminaries

Commitment schemes
A cryptographic commitment scheme allows a user U to commit to a chosen value, while keeping it hidden to others. This is done with the help of a commitment function Com. The function Com is called -binding, if, after publishing Com(x), it is computationally infeasible for U to find a y = x such that Com(y) = Com(x). Informally spoken, U is not able to change x after having commited to it. -hiding, if it is infeasible for an attacker to compute x from Com(x).
In practical applications, a commitment function is usually realized by a collision and pre-image resistant resistant hash function.
Identification schemes
In an identification scheme the Prover P wants to convince the Verifyer V that he really is P. In cryptography, this is usually done by a Zero-Knowledge proof of Knowledge (ZKP): P proofs to V that he knows a secret s without giving away any information about this secret. By doing so, the verifier gets no information about s which prevents him from impersonating P.
The standard construction of a (3-pass) identification scheme works as follows:
1. Commitment step: The prover P uses a commitment function Com to compute one (or several) commitment com. He sends com to the verifier. 2. Challenge step: V chooses randomly a challenge Ch from a given set and sends it to P. 3. Response step: Depending on his commitments and the challenge Ch the prover P computes the response Rsp and sends it to V . V checks if Rsp is correct, i.e. if Rsp corresponds to the commitment com and his challenge Ch.
The basic security criteria of an identification scheme are -Completeness: The prover P is always able to perform the identification protocol correctly. -Soundness: An entity which does not know the secret s fails the identification protocol with some probability p > 0. We call 1− p the impersonation probability of the scheme. By repeating the identification protocol r times, we are able to reduce the impersonation probability to (1 − p) r . Therefore we can reach any bound on the impersonation probability. -Zero-Knowledge: By performing the identification protocol, the verifier V does not get any information on the secret s.
Threshold ring signatures
Threshold ring signatures were introduced in 2002 by Bresson, Stern and Szydlo [7] . The receiver of a (t, N )-threshold ring signature shall be convinced that t (among a larger group of N ) users have signed a message without being able to identify this subgroup. To produce a threshold ring signature, the group of signers chooses a leader L, which gathers the individual signatures and communicates with the verifier (see Fig. 3 ).
Definition 1 Let t < N be integers. A (t, N )-threshold
The basic security criteria of a threshold ring signature scheme are -Correctness: A fairly generated (t, N )-threshold ring signature is accepted with overwhelming probability. -Unforgeability: Without the knowledge of at least t of the private keys it is infeasible to generate a valid (t, N )-threshold ring signature. More formally we can define this property by the following game: 1. The challenger C uses algorithm KeyGen to produce key pairs sk i , pk i (i = 1, . . . , N ). He gives all the public keys to the forger F and keeps the secret keys for himself. 2. F is allowed to ask the following queries:
-Signing query: F chooses a message m and gives it to C . The challenger uses algorithm Sign to produce a threshold ring signature σ for the message m and gives it to F . -Corrupt query: F chooses an integer i ∈ 1, . . . , N . C gives him the corresponding private key sk i . Note that the number of corrupt queries must be strictly less than t. F wins the game, if he can generate a valid threshold ring signature σ for a new message m . A threshold ring signature scheme, for which the success probability of F is negligible, is called existentially unforgeable under chosen message attacks.
-Source-Hiding: Given a message-signature pair (m, σ ), it is infeasible for the verifier to reveal which t-subset of signers contributed to σ . More formally, we can define this property by the following game: Let S 1 = {P 11 , . . . , P 1t } and S 2 = {P 21 , . . . , P 2t } be two different groups of signers. The attacker is allowed to ask both groups to sign messages. Finally, he gets a message m and a signature σ which was generated by one of the groups. He succeeds, if he can decide which group signed the message with probability > 1 2 . Many threshold ring signature schemes are based on a threshold ring identification scheme and the Fiat-Shamir paradigm.
In a threshold ring identification scheme the t signers choose a leader L, which gathers the individual commitments and responses and communicates with the verifier. Figure 1 shows one round of such a scheme.
Fiat-Shamir heuristic
The Fiat-Shamir heuristic [12] is a general way to convert an identification scheme into a signature scheme. The idea is to start from a 3-pass identification scheme (with commitment com, challenge Ch and response Rsp; see Sect. 2.2). To sign a message m, the signer produces a valid transcript (com, Ch, Rsp) of the interactive identification protocol. Here, the Challenge Ch is computed by Ch = R(m, com) for a random oracle R. Since the challenge Ch can be computed out of the message and the commitments, it has not to be part of the signature. Therefore, a signature has the form 1
As shown by Pointcheval and Stern in [17] , an honest-verifier zero-knowledge 3-pass identification scheme leads via the Fiat-Shamir heuristic to a signature scheme, which is existentially unforgeable under chosen message attacks (see Sect. 2.3) in the random oracle model.
Multivariate cryptography
Multivariate Cryptography is one of the main candidates to guarantee the security of communication in the post-quantum world. Since multivariate cryptosystems need only simple operations (namely addition and multiplication over small finite fields), they require only modest computational resources which makes them suitable for the use on low cost devices like RFID chips and smartcards. Additionally, multivariate schemes seem to be faster than classical Public-Key-Cryptosystems like RSA and ECC [4, 9] . A good overview on existing multivariate schemes can be found in [10] .
Multivariate quadratic systems
The basic objects of multivariate cryptography are systems of multivariate quadratic equations over a finite field F. We write such a system of m equations in n variables as
The security of multivariate cryptosystems is based on the
The MQ-Problem is proven to be NP-hard even for quadratic systems over the field of two elements [13] .
The most efficient method for solving multivariate polynomial systems is the Hybrid approach [3] of Bettale, Faugère and Perret, which combines exhaustive search and Faugères F 5 algorithm [11] . For nonlinear systems over G F (2) it was proposed in [5] to use an algorithm combining exhaustive search and Gray codes.
Remark For most of the existing multivariate public key cryptosystems the coefficients of the public system P are not chosen randomly. Instead one starts with an easily invertible quadratic map F (called central map) and combines it with two invertible affine maps S and T to get a public key of the form P = S • F • T . Therefore, the security of the scheme is based not only on the MQ-Problem, but also on the EIP-Problem (Extended Isomorphism of Polynomials).
EIP-Problem
Given a multivariate quadratic system P expressable as P = S • F • T with two invertible affine maps S and T and a map F belonging to a special class C of multivariate quadratic maps, find a decomposition of P of the form P = S • F • T with two invertible affine maps S and T and a quadratic map
There is not much known about the hardness of the EIP-Problem. In fact, for some classes of central maps C (e.g. Balanced Oil and Vinegar [14] ), the EIP-Problem is very easy to solve. This fact prevented researchers to give security proofs for their multivariate public key cryptosystems. In contrast to these schemes, the security of our threshold ring signature scheme is based solely on the MQ-Problem. Therefore, it is one of the first multivariate schemes which offer provable security (see Sect. 5).
The MQ-based identification scheme
At CRYPTO 2011 Sakumoto et al. [19] presented a new multivariate identification scheme whose security is based solely on the MQ-Problem.
In the scheme we have a multivariate quadratic system P : F n → F m which is viewed as a system parameter and fixed for a large number of users. Every user chooses a vector s ∈ F n as his secret key and computes his public key as v = P(s) ∈ F m .
To identify himself to a verifier, he has to show that he indeed knows s (without revealing any information about s).
To create a zero-knowledge proof of the vector s, we need the so called polar form of the multivariate system P, which is defined as
Note that G (x, y) is bilinear in x and y.
Remark In general, the polar form of a multivariate system P is given by
. But, since for both the identification scheme of [19] and our scheme the system P does not have constant terms, the term P(0) vanishes.
The basic observation of [19] is the following: The knowledge of s is equivalent to knowing a tuple (r 0 , r 1 , t 0 , t 1 , e 0 , e 1 ) satisfying
Under the assumption that there exists a binding and hiding commitment scheme Com, 2 the authors of [19] used this observation to create a zero knowledge proof for a solution of the system P(x) = v (see Fig. 2 ). The scheme as shown in Fig. 2 has a cheating probability per round of 2 3 . Therefore, one needs 52 rounds to reduce the impersonation probability to less than 2 −30 .
The authors of [19] propose for their scheme F = G F(2), n = 84, m = 80 to achieve a security level of 80 bit. For this parameter set, the communication cost of the scheme (52 rounds) is 29,640 bits or 3.6 kB.
Additionally to the 3-pass version shown in Fig. 2 , the authors of [19] presented a 5-pass version of their scheme. Furthermore, in [16] and [18] , the scheme was extended to polynomials of higher degree. In this paper, we restrict ourselves to the original approach (3-pass version). 2 The identification scheme of [19] 4 Our threshold ring signature scheme
From identification to threshold ring identification
The authors of [19] propose to use the system P as a system parameter which stays the same for all users. Every user chooses randomly a vector s ∈ F n as his private key and publishes v = P(s) ∈ F m as his public key. In our scheme, we turn this around. In a threshold ring signature scheme, the leader must be able to simulate the actions of the non-signers without knowing their secrets. To enable this, we fix the vector v ∈ F m of the identification scheme to zero. Then, every user P i chooses randomly a private key s i ∈ F n and creates a system P i such that P i (s i ) = 0 (see Sect. 4.2 and Algorithm 1). If P i does not contain constant terms, the zero vector 0 ∈ F n is always a solution of the system. This enables the leader to simulate the actions of the non-signers without knowing their secrets.
The verifier of the threshold ring signature scheme must be able to recognize how many of the possible signers contributed to the signature. To enable this, we add the following test to the scheme. For fields of characteristic 2 we have
Note that the second "⇔" is not really an "⇔". While the "⇒" always holds for a deterministic commitment function the "⇐" holds only computationally due to the binding property of the commitment function. In the following we always work over fields of characteristic 2. Basically we could make the test (5) at any point of the verification process. However, in a threshold ring signature scheme, the verifier must not be able to identify the non-signers. To achieve this, we use a permutation ∈ S N which permutes the N users before applying the test (5) . This leads to a rather difficult problem: Regardless of the challenge, the public key P (or its polar form G ) is used during the verification step of the identification scheme. Therefore, if we permute the secret keys, the verification step can no longer be performed correctly. One possibility to solve this problem is to extend the protocol as follows:
Each signer P i sends the two additional commitments c
1 ) to the leader, who chooses randomly a permutation ∈ S N and sends
3 )) and
4 )) to the verifier. On the Challenge Ch = 3, the leader reveals (c Remark This additional Challenge Ch = 3 is the main difference between our scheme and schemes like [1] , where the test (5) can be performed during the execution of Stern's protocol. Because of this additional step the cheating probability per round increases to 3 4 and we need more rounds to reach given security levels. But, since the responses of the MQ-identification scheme [19] are significantly shorter than in [1] , we still get smaller communication costs and signature sizes (see Sect. 6).
The identification scheme
Let U be a group of N users. A subgroup S ⊂ U of t signers wants to identify themselves to a verifier. To do this, the signers choose a leader L which gathers the commitments and responses of the single signers and communicates with the verifier (see Fig. 3 ).
Key generation
Let F be a field of characteristic 2. Every user P i ∈ U chooses randomly a vector s i ∈ F n and creates a quadratic system P i : F n → F m such that P i (s i ) = 0. P i must not contain constant terms. Algorithm 1 shows the key generation process of our scheme.
Here, p
t is the coefficient of the monomial x t in the jth component of P. The vector v computed in line 4 of the algorithm is a random looking vector in F m . In line 7 we change some of the linear coefficients of the system P in such a way that all the non zero elements of v are put to zero. Therefore we ensure that the public key derived by Algorithm 1 is a system P of m quadratic polynomials in n variables without constant terms such that P(s) = 0. The homogeneous quadratic part of the system P can be seen as a system parameter which is fixed for all N users and might be given by a random seed. This reduces the size of the public key by a large factor (see Table 3 ).
Remark The coefficients of the homogeneous quadratic part of P are randomly chosen (line 3) and not changed during the algorithm. Therefore, under the natural assumption that the cost of solving a quadratic system depends mainly on its homogeneous quadratic part, 3 solving the equation P(s) = 0 for our scheme is as difficult as solving a random instance of the MQ-Problem.
The public key of the group is simply the concatenation of all public keys, i.e. P = P 1 || · · · ||P N .
The Identification protocol
One round of our threshold ring identification scheme works as follows:
Each of the t signers P i ∈ S (including the leader) chooses
and sends c 
and c (i)
4 for the N − t non-signers P i ∈ U \S (using 0 as "secret" s i ), chooses a random permutation ∈ S N , computes the master commitments 
4 )) and sends RS P to the verifier. For Ch = 3, the permutation ∈ S N is used on the upper indices of c 
1 , e
1 .
and checks, if
. . ,c (N )
2 ) and
3 )).
-If Ch = 1, he parses RS P into r 2 ).
-If Ch = 2, he parses RS P into , r 
Remark By checking the property (6) the verifier can test if indeed t of the N signers used a non-zero secret key and therefore contributed to the signature. However, due to the permutation , he is not able to identify these signers.
The signature scheme
By using the Fiat-Shamir paradigm we can transform this identification scheme into a threshold ring signature scheme. The key generation process for the signature scheme works just as for the threshold identification scheme. Every user i calls Algorithm 1 to get his secret and s i and public key P i . The public key of the group is given by P = P 1 || . . . ||P N .
To produce a threshold ring signature for a message m, the leader gathers the commitments of the signers (for all rounds), and creates the master commitments C (1) 
(following step 2 of the threshold identification scheme). He then uses a hash function H to produce the challenge vector 4
He sends the vector Ch to his co-signers which compute their responses. Finally the leader computes the master responses and creates the signature
To verify the authenticity of a signature, the verifier parses σ into C
, RS P (1) , RS P (2) , . . . , RS P (#rounds) , computes the challenge vector (see Eq. (7)) and tests for each i ∈ {1, . . . , #rounds} if RS P (i) is a correct response to Ch i according to C 
(r
As shown in [19] , these three equations lead, for every i = 1, . . . , N , to a solution
We show that at least t of these solutions are = 0.
To pass challenge 3 of the protocol, the test (equation (6)) has to be fulfilled for at least t indices i 1 , . . . , i t . With our notation this can be written as
Due to (0) = (2) =: (c.f. Eq. (10)) and Eqs. (12) and (13) this is equivalent tõ
which again is computationally equivalent to
Finally, we see that this is equivalent tô
which means that the attacker has found t vectorsŝ (i j ) ∈ F n \{0} with
Remark Lemma 1 states that, in order to pass r rounds of the scheme with probability ≥ 3 4 r , an attacker has to break at least one instance of the MQ-Problem. This is true even if the attacker corrupts up to t − 1 signers. By increasing the number r , we can decrease the cheating probability to be lower than every security margin.
Lemma 2 (Zero-knowledge) Our threshold ring identification scheme is zero knowledge if the commitment scheme Com is hiding.
Proof Let S be a simulator which knows all the public keys P i (i = 1, . . . , N ) , but does not know t of the private keys. W.l.o.g. we can assume that S does not know any of the private keys. Therefore we can neglect the interactions between the signers and the leader L and S simulates just the interactions between the leader and a cheating verifier C V . At the beginning, S chooses a value Ch ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}. Ch is a prediction, of what challenge the verifier will not choose.
If Ch = 3, the simulator sets alls i (i = 1, . . . , N ) to zero, chooses randomlỹ r
1 and e (i)
0 . After that he creates the commitmentsc i = 1, . . . , N ) , chooses a random permutation ∈ S N and creates the master commitmentsC 0 ,C 1 ,C 2 ,C 3 andC 4 as described in step 2 of the protocol. It is obvious that S can answer the challenges 0, 1 and 2 correctly.
If Ch = 3, S choosess i ,r
0 ∈ F m at random and computes r (i)
, chooses a random permutation and creates the master commitmentsC 0 ,C 1 ,C 2 ,C 3 andC 4 following step 2 of the protocol.
If Ch = Ch, S is able to answer Ch correctly. Therefore, S outputs a valid transcript of one round of the threshold identification scheme with probability 3 4 . Furthermore, this output is indistinguishable from a real transcript of the scheme.
Remark It is also impossible for the leader to get information about the signers' private keys. The interactions between the leader and the signers follow the identification scheme of [19] , which is zero knowledge. Since the commitment scheme is hiding, the two additional commitments sent by each signer to the leader make no difference to this fact. In the following we show by applying the forking lemma several times that every attacker who can produce a valid signature for a message m can find non trivial solutions for at least t of the MQ-Problems
) and RS P = (RS P (1) ||RS P (2) || . . . ||RS P (#rounds) ) be a valid threshold signature for a message m (see Eq. (8)). For the following we look at a certain round i 0 . Let's assume that Ch (i 0 ) = 0. By using the forking lemma we can get other valid signatures σ 1 , . . . , σ 3 of the form σ j = (C O M, Ch j , RS P j ) with Ch
This means that the attacker can in at least one round answer all 4 challenges correctly. According to Lemma 1 this enables him to extract t vectors s i 1 , . . . , s i t ∈ F n \ {0} such that P i j (s i j ) = 0.
Theorem 2 The resulting threshold ring signature scheme is source hiding.
Proof For the challenges 0,1 and 2 the responses of both a signer and a non-signer are completely indistinguishable, since r 0 , t 0 and e 0 are chosen uniformly at random and therefore the responses are random, too. So, the only possibility for the verifier to identify non-signers is challenge 3. In this case he checks whether the two values Com(r 0 ) and Com(r 1 ) are equal, which implies r 0 = r 1 and therefore s = r 0 +r 1 = 0. But in this case the possible signers are mixed by a random permutation . Since the verifier has no access to this permutation, he is not able to identify non-signers.
Parameters and comparison
In contrast to the authors of [19] , we suggest to use a determined system P for our threshold ring identification (and signature) scheme (i.e. m = n). The reason for this is that a greater number of variables does not increase the security of our scheme [5] . Therefore we propose for our scheme (80 bit security) the parameters
Thus, the public key size of our scheme is m · 
Reducing the communication cost
To reduce the cost of communication, one can use the following trick [19] : In step 2 of the protocol, the leader sends
to the verifier. The responses in step 5 are changed as follows
In step 6 of the protocol, the verifier computes the remaining C i 's and checks, if C O M was created honestly. By doing so, one can reduce the communication cost per round by on average 240 bit.
Furthermore it is possible to perform all 73 (or 193) rounds of the scheme on parallel. Therewith, the communication cost can be reduced further by 160 · (#rounds − 1) bit:
Instead of sending C O M for each round separately, the leader sends The verifier computes C O M for each round and finally tests if C O M was computed honestly. By doing so, the leader has to send only 1 hash value to the verifier. Table 1 shows the communication cost of our scheme for different parameters.
Reducing the signature length
The trick mentioned in the previous subsection can also be used to reduce the signature length of our scheme. After having computed the master commitments C
(1)
(see Sect. 4.3), the leader uses a hash function H to compute
The challenge vector is then obtained by
for a message m. By doing so, the leader gets a signature of the form
where the responses RS P i are computed as shown in Sect. 6.1.
To verify the authenticity of a signature, the verifier computes for each round the remaining C i and finally checks the correctness of C O M.
The length of a so obtained signature is given by
In particular, the signature length is independent of t and linear in N . Table 2 shows the signature lengths of our scheme for different values of N . The signature lengths shown in Table 2 correspond to 193 rounds of the scheme, which leads to a security level of 80 bit. The computationally most expensive operations in our scheme are the polynomial evaluations of the systems P i and G i of which the latter can be performed by three evaluations of P i . Therefore we have on average 23 4 · N evaluations of systems of m equations in n variables per round. For the whole scheme (193 rounds), we get a computational effort of 1110 · N polynomial evaluations and 1448 · (N + 1) hash function evaluations. In particular, the computational complexity of our scheme is independent of t and linear in N . Table 3 compares our scheme with other existing Post-Quantum threshold ring signature schemes.
Comparison
As the Table 3 shows, our scheme produces shorter signatures than code-or lattice based constructions. The reason for this is that the responses RS P in our threshold identification scheme (see Sect. 4) are relatively short (on average 266· N bit compared to 828 · N bit for the code-based scheme). This has a much greater influence on the signature length than the number of rounds, which is larger in our scheme.
Remark By our method, it is also possible to extend the 5-pass version of the MQidentification scheme of [19] and the more advanced schemes of [16] and [18] to threshold ring identification (and signature) schemes. However, we obtain the most efficient solution by basing our scheme on the 3-pass version of the identification scheme of [19] .
Conclusion and future work
In this paper we proposed a new threshold ring identification and signature scheme, whose security is based solely on the MQ-Problem. Our scheme is the first multivariate scheme of this kind and the first multivariate signature scheme with special properties. Furthermore it offers provable security, which is quite a rare fact in multivariate cryptography. Despite the fact that our scheme requires more rounds than other post-quantum threshold ring signature schemes, the signatures are significantly smaller. The scheme also enjoys smaller secret keys.
As Future work we plan to create other provable secure multivariate signature schemes with special properties (forward secure, identity-based, etc.)
